South Carolina Law Review
Volume 27
Issue 2 Annual Survey of South Carolina Law-Part I

Article 4

6-1975

Constitutional Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
(1975) "Constitutional Law," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 27 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

et al.: Constitutional Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I.

SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. Home Rule
1. Special Purpose Districts
In May, 1973, the General Assembly created the Lower
Dorchester County Recreation District Commission, a "special
purpose" district, to provide recreational facilities for an area
outlined by Dorchester School District 5.' Shortly thereafter, another act of the legislature authorized this commission to issue
general obligation bonds amounting to $200,000.2 Suit was

brought by a taxpayer of Dorchester County attacking the two
statutes as being violative of article 8, the new "home rule" provision of the South Carolina Constitution. 3 The supreme court, in

Knight v. Salisbury,4 ruled that the local government provisions
of the constitution, as recently amended, prohibited the creation
and funding of "special purpose" districts by the General Assembly.
Article 8 of the South Carolina Constitution was substantially rewritten by the Committee to Make a Study of the South
Carolina Constitution of 1895. 5 The revision was approved by the
electorate and ratified by the General Assembly in March of
1973.6 It reflected an effort and desire on the part of the state,
through its citizens and their elected representatives, to decentralize the state government. Questions of local government could
be resolved on the county level without the necessity of special
legislation or supervision by legislators from other counties. Before the passage of the amended version of article 8, "special
purpose" districts had to be created within individual counties by
the General Assembly to provide for certain governmental services.' The creation of these "special purpose" districts has been
sustained in the past as an exercise of the plenary powers of the
1. No. 259, [1973] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 302.
2. No. 644, [1973] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1239.
3. Knight v. Salisbury, 262 S.C. 565, 206 S.E.2d 875 (1974).
4. Id.
5. FINAL REPORT - COMMITTEE TO MAKE A STUDY OF THE S. C. CONSTrrUTION OF 1895.

6. No. 63, [1973] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 67.
7. Examples of such districts are those providing for drainage, hospitals, or recreation. 262 S.C. at 573, 206 S.E.2d at 878.
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legislature to take any actions not specifically prohibited by the
constitution. The major question arising in Knight was whether
or not certain new sections of article 8 served to curtail the General Assembly's power to act in this area by reserving such power
to the counties.'
The majority concluded that the language in section 7 forbidding the passage of laws for a specific county prohibited the state
legislature from exercising its plenary power to create a district

carrying out governmental functions solely within that county."0
The court's interpretation was drawn, to a great extent, from the
premise that the provision in section 7 allowing counties to tax
different areas at different rates according to municipal services
received, implies a power in the county to create their own "special purpose" districts." The basis of this premise was an assumption that the provision allowing different tax rates for certain
areas of a county would be necessary only if such county had the
power to create subdivisions for the delivery of municipal services
similar to "special purpose" districts. 2 If the counties had such
a power, they would need the taxation provision of section 7 to
allow the levy of a higher tax on areas, within such a district,
which are receiving more municipal services. 3 The majority reasoned that this implication of authority to the counties to create
8. Id.
9. Id. at 572, 206 S.E.2d at 878. The relevant sections of article 8 were:
§ 1. Powers of political subdivisions continued. The powers possessed by
all counties, cities, towns, and other political subdivisions at the effective date
of this Constitution shall continue until changed in a manner provided by law.
(1972 (57) 3184; 1973 (50) 67.)
§ 7. Organization, powers, duties, etc., of counties; special laws prohibited. The General Assembly shall provide by general law for the structure,
organization,powers, duties, functions, and the responsibilitiesof counties, including the power to tax different areas at different rates of taxation related to
the natureand level of governmental services provided. Alternate forms of government, not to exceed five, shall be established. No laws for a specific county
shall be enacted and no county shall be exempted from the general laws or laws
applicable to the selected alternative form of government. (1972 (57) 3184; 1973
(58) 67.) (emphasis added).
§ 17. Construction of Constitution and laws. The provisions of this Constitution and all laws concerning local government shall be liberally construed
in their favor. Powers, duties, and responsibilities granted local government
subdivisions by this Constitution and by law shall include those fairly implied
and not prohibited by this Constitution.
10. 262 S.C. at 574, 206 S.E.2d at 879.
11. Id. at 573, 206 S.E.2d at 878.
12. Id. at 572, 206 S.E.2d at 878.
13. Id.
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special purpose districts obviated the need for action by the legislature and indicated an intent14 to extinguish the plenary powers
of the legislature in this area.
The Recreation District argued that the language in section
7 requiring the General Assembly to enact general laws providing
for the structure and outlining the functions of county governments rendered the section inoperative until such general laws
were passed.15 If this proposition were correct, then the practical
implementation of article 8 could be postponed indefinitely by
the inaction of the General Assembly. The majority of the court
felt that it would be unreasonable "to assume that the framers
of article VIII intended to give the General Assembly veto power
over its effectiveness.""6 In making this determination the court
looked to section 1 of the article, which specifically provides for
the continuation of the powers of counties, cities, towns and other
political subdivisions in matters of local government. They inferred that the exclusion of the legislature from the list of those
to end the
whose powers were to be continued indicated an intent
7
issues.
local
purely
on
act
to
power
legislature's
The dissent attacked the majority's position by arguing that
a liberal interpretation of section 7 was prohibited by well established principles of constitutional interpretation. It was the opinion of the dissenting justices that the interpretation given section
7 by the majority would repeal, by implication, article 10, section
6, which lists the permissible purposes for which the legislature
may authorize counties to levy taxes and issue bonds. 8 The ma14. Id. at 574, 206 S.E.2d at 879.
15. Id. at 571, 206 S.E.2d at 877.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 572, 206 S.E.2d at 878.
18. Id. at 575, 206 S.E.2d at 880. S.C. CONST. art. 10, § 6 provides:
Credit of State; for what purposes county or township taxes levied or bonds
issued.-The credit of the State shall not be pledged or loaned for the benefit
of any individual, company, association or corporation; and the State shall not
become a joint owner of or stockholder in any company, association or corporation. The General Assembly may, however, authorize the South Carolina Public
Service Authority to become a joint owner with privately owned electric utilities,
of electric generation or transmission facilities, or both, and to enter into and
carry out agreements with respect to such jointly owned facilities. The General
Assembly shall not have power to authorize any county or township to levy a
tax or issue bonds for any purpose except for educational purposes, to build and
repair public roads, buildings and bridges, to maintain and support prisoners,
pay jurors, County officers, and for litigation, quarantine and court expenses
and for ordinary County purposes to support paupers, and pay past indebtedness.
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jority's interpretation would allow the General Assembly to create a county government with the ability to tax and issue bonds
to support a "special purpose" recreational district; since recreational purposes are not enumerated as permissible in article 10,
section 6, such an interpretation would place the two provisions
squarely in conflict.19 When two constitutional provisions are subject to differing interpretations, some compatible and some conflicting, it is a basic principle of constitutional construction that
a nonconflicting interpretation be chosen in order to give effect
to both sections. The dissent felt that a perfectly reasonable alternative to the majority's interpretation of section 7, which would
leave both provisions valid, would be to read it as saying, "counties shall have the power to tax different areas at different rates
of taxation relative to the varying and constitutionallypermissible governmental services provided.""0 This would mean that
the General Assembly, through general legislation, could authorize counties to implement the taxation provisions of article 8,
section 7, to tax for permissible purposes under article 10, section 6 and other specifically allowed purposes such as the public
utility expenditures authorized by article 8, section 16.21 But
funds for purposes not specifically allowed to the counties would
have to be acquired through "special purpose" districts created
by the General Assembly. The majority seemed to attribute any
conflict between article 10, section 6 and article 8 to the fact that
article 10 has yet to be amended as part of the revision process
of the Constitution of 1895.2 With this in mind, they felt that
any differences between the provisions must be resolved in favor
of article 8 as it is the "latest expression of the electorate as to
its will for constitutional provisions on this subject." Although
the majority's interpretation fails to harmonize section 7 com19. 262 S.C. at 578, 206 S.E.2d at 881.
20. Id. at 579, 206 S.E.2d at 881 (emphasis added).
21. S.C. CONST. art. 8, § 16 provides, in part:
Any county or consolidated political subdivision created under this Constitution
may, upon a majority vote of the electors voting on the question in such county
or consolidated political subdivision, acquire by initial construction or purchase
and may operate water, sewer, transportation or other public utility systems and
plants other than gas and electric; provided this provision shall not prohibit the
continued operation of gas and electric, water, sewer or other such utility systems of a municipality which becomes a part of a consolidated political subdivision.
22. 262 S.C. at 574, 206 S.E.2d at 879.
23. Id.
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pletely with article 10, section 6, it is at least in line with the
spirit of decentralization behind the movement towards "home
rule" and the intent of article 8 to implement this movement.
2.

Gift of Public Property to Private Persons

Another constitutional question arose in 1974 involving the
proper meaning of the term "public building" as used in article
10, section 6 of the state constitution. The relevant portion of that
provision reads, "The General Assembly shall not have power to
authorize any county or township to levy a tax or issue bonds for
any purpose except . . . to build and repair public roads,
buildings and bridges .. "24 In Jacobs v. McClain,2 5 the plaintiffs attacked the validity of a statute2 enacted by the General
Assembly which allowed the Clinton Hospital District to issue
bonds for the purpose of constructing an office building adjacent
to the hospital which would be rented to staff physicians as private offices. The plaintiffs alleged that the proposed construction
was not a public building in that the primary purpose of the
with offices
building would be to provide private individuals
27
rather than to directly benefit the public.
In determining whether or not a building is "public" for purposes of inclusion in article 10, section 6, the South Carolina
Supreme Court, historically, has looked to the purpose for which
the building was to be used and has attempted to categorize this
purpose as either private or public.21 In addition, for a building
to be characterized as being built for a public purpose, its purpose
must not only benefit the public, but this benefit must be primary rather than incidental. 29 This means that benefits flowing
to the public as the result of a benefit directly conferred on a
private individual or group may not be considered in determining
the public character of a building under article 10, section 6. In
Jacobs,3° the court reiterated the test set forth in Feldman & Co.
24. S.C. CONST. art. 10, § 6. The text of this provision is quoted in full in note 18

supra.
25. 262 S.C. 425, 205 S.E.2d 172 (1974).
26. No. 1884, [1972] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 3749.
27. 262 S.C. at 427, 205 S.E.2d at 173.
28. See Battle v. Willcox, 128 S.C. 500, 122 S.E. 516 (1924).
29. See Feldman & Co. v. City Council of Charleston, 23 S.C. 57 (1884). This case
discussed the concept of "public purpose" generally and not in relation to a particular
building.
30. See note 25 supra.
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v. City Council of Charleston." The Feldman court found that
"incidental advantage to the public, or to the State, which results
from the promotion of private interests, and the prosperity of
private enterprises or business, [did] not justify their aid by the
use of public money raised by taxation, or for which taxation may
become necessary. '"32

The Clinton Hospital District, in urging that the building
was primarily for a public purpose, argued that the efficiency of
its medical staff would be increased by allowing them to maintain
their private practices near the hospital, thus reducing travel
time between their duties.3 Further, such a convenient arrangement was said to be necessary to enable the district to attract
more younger physicians into the area." The court felt that regardless of how great the incidental advantages to the public
might be, the primary benefit of this program was being extended
to a private group (the staff physicians); the undertaking, therefore, must be termed private and constitutionally prohibited.3
The plaintiff contended that the constitutional validity of
the project should be judged according to whether it bore a "reasonable relationship" to a valid public purpose. 6 The court, refusing to adopt this standard, stated flatly and without comment
that the project failed to pass even this less stringent constitutional standard." In its decision, the court employed a relatively
inflexible rule which seems to provide that if an indirect benefit
to the public, no matter how great, results from a direct benefit
to a private interest, no matter how small, then the public benefit
is incidental and the purpose must be deemed private for purposes of analysis under article 10, section 6.
In McKinney v. City of Greenville,3 the supreme court faced
a situation similar to that in Jacobs. Article 3, section 31 of the
South Carolina Constitution bars the state from donating lands
it owns or controls to a private individual or group. 9 In 1971 both
31. See note 29 supra.
32. 23 S.C. at 63.
33. Record at 13, Jacobs v.McClain, see note 25 supra.
34. Id.
35. 262 S.C. at 428, 205 S.E.2d at 173.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 262 S.C. 227, 203 S.E.2d 680 (1974).
39. S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 31 (1895) provides:
Public Lands.-Lands belonging to or under the control of the State shall never
be donated, directly or indirectly, to private corporations or individuals, or to
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the City and County of Greenville became interested in becoming
the proposed location of a new chemical plant and realized.a need
to engage in competition with several other possible sites.4" In
order to make the Greenville area as attractive a location as possible, the two governmental units devised a plan whereby they
would lease 100 acres of jointly owned property to the industry
for 99 years. The lease did not require cash rental payments or
any other consideration except the payment of ad valorem taxes
on improvements made to the acreage.4 1 The lease did, however,
require that the company make substantial improvements in accordance with a regular schedule to insure a minimum return in
taxes to the county. 2 Since only the county could collect these ad
valorem taxes, the city sold its interest in the property to the
county in order to realize a benefit from the transaction.
The plaintiffs, taxpayers in Greenville County, brought an
action to have this lease and the statute 3 authorizing it set aside
railroad companies. Nor shall such land be sold to corporations, or associations,
for a less price than that for which it can be sold to individuals. This, however,
shall not prevent the General Assembly from granting a right of way, not exceeding one hundred and fifty feet in width, as a mere easement to railroads across
State land, nor to interfere with the discretion of the General Assembly in
confirming the title to lands claimed to belong to the State, but used or possessed by other parties under an adverse claim.
40. This was the result of a desire by the business community to diversify local
industry in order that the economy of the area would not be so greatly dependent on
textiles. See Record at 30, McKinney v. City of Greenville, 262 S.C. 227, 203 S.E.2d 680
(1974). There was also testimony offered to the effect that the plant was to be both
environmentally acceptable and aesthetically pleasing. Record at 56.
41. 262 S.C. at 232, 203 S.E.2d at 682.
42. The court related the required minimum schedule for improvements:
Initial term of 10 years, not less than ten million ($10,000,000) Dollars
Secord term of 15 years, fifteen million ($15,000,000) Dollars
Third term of 25 years, twenty million ($20,000,000) Dollars
Fourth term of 25 years, twenty-five million ($25,000,000) Dollars
Fifth term of 24 years, twenty-five million ($25,000,000) Dollars
Until such time as the capital improvements specified for each term are
completed by Olin, the lease is not renewable for the following term, and, on
the other hand, when a total capital investment of twenty-five million
($25,000,000) Dollars has been made on this facility, Olin shall be entitled to a
lease for the remainder of the 99 year period.
Id. at 232, 203 S.E.2d at 683.
43. No. 573, [1967] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1084, as amended No. 111, [1971] S.C. Acts
& Jt. Res. 89. This section provides in part:
3. To lease, sell or otherwise dispose of real and personal property in the
name of the county, including all such property now owned by the county based
upon a fair and reasonable value. In determining fair and reasonable value,
County Council shall take into account a value to be determined by one or more
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as being violative of article 3, section 31. They claimed the lease
constituted a donation of state property because it failed to contain provisions requiring adequate consideration. In McKinney v.
City of Greenville," the supreme court adopted the trial court's
order that both the lease and the authorizing statute were valid.
The transaction before the court was carried out pursuant to
an act of the General Assembly providing, in part, that Greenville
County has power "[t]o lease, sell or otherwise dispose of real
and personal property in the name of the county, including all
such property now owned by the county based upon a fair and
reasonable value." 45 The plaintiffs contended that the language
of this statute regarding the determination of value was too vague
to insure that the constitutional prohibition of donations was
obeyed."6 The court accepted the trial judge's finding that the
statute was patently valid under article 3, section 31, because the
"fair and reasonable value" requirement precluded any "donation" of lands for private use." This interpretation of the statute
is strengthened by the presence of specific steps in the Act which
the county council must take to determine "fair and reasonable
value," such as appraisals and future income for taxation."
The lease arrangement itself in this case was held not to be
a donation of state lands for two reasons. First, despite the fact
that no rental payments were received, the court found that the
increased return to the county in taxes was perfectly acceptable
consideration for the lease and would serve to prevent it from
being a donation under the constitution. In interpreting article 3,
section 31 in the past, the court has found that the prohibition
against donations of property did not bar the government from
characterizing, as consideration, indirect benefits resulting from
a transaction as well as direct cash contract receipts.49 The court
summarized its position in a quote from State v. Broad River
appraisals made by competent realtors and may take into account prospective
tax revenues from improvements to be constructed on the property as well as
any other considerations. Any transfer of property, upon being approved by at
least six members of County Council, shall be signed by the chairman and clerk
of County Council.
44. See note 40 supra.
45. See note 43 supra.
46. 262 S.C. at 241, 203 S.E.2d at 687.
47. Id. at 242, 203 S.E.2d at 688.
48. See note 43 supra.
49. See generallyElliot v. McNair, 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E.2d 421 (1967); State v. Broad
River Power Co., 177 S.C. 240, 181 S.E. 41 (1935).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss2/4

8

et al.: Constitutional Law

1975]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Power Co. ,0 which involved the exchange by the state of rights
in the Columbia Canal for electricity: "[T]he direct benefits
expected to result from the improvement of the land granted, by
way of promotion of the public convenience, increase in the value
of adjacent property, and taxes to be paid on the improvements
themselves are sufficient to keep such a grant from amounting to
a donation within the constitutional inhibition."5 The projected
income to Greenville County in ad valorem taxes for the maxi-2
mum lease term of 99 years was found to be over $30 million.1
Since the appraised value of the property was $350,000,-" the
average yearly income to the county, as a result of the transaction, equalled 85 percent of the value of the property.54 The financial return, along with the incidental benefit to the local economy
in general, was found to be sufficient consideration to negate any
claim that the transaction amounted to a "donation."
Secondly, the court found that the language of article 3, section 31 prohibiting the donation of state lands was limited in its
application "only to lands held by the state in its capacity as
sovereign proprietor."55 Past decisions justify the finding that this
section does not apply where title to the lands in question has
been validly acquired from an individual by the governing body
of a political subdivision. 6 The property in this case had been
acquired jointly by the City and County of Greenville from private citizens57 and would seem to come directly under the hypo58
thetical posed by the court in Haelsloop v. City of Charleston.
In Haelsloop the court observed that "[h]ad the land here involved been granted by the State to an individual, and subsequently conveyed to the city council, it would scarcely be contended that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1895
it was land belonging to or under control of the state."59
50. Id.
51. 177 S.C. at 264, 181 S.E. at 52.
52. 262 S.C. at 245, 203 S.E.2d at 689.
53. Record at 40, McKinney v. City of Greenville, 262 S.C. 227, 203 S.E.2d 680 (1974).
This valuation was accepted by the trial judge as accurate. 262 S.C. at 245, 203 S.E.2d at
689.
54. 262 S.C. at 245, 203 S.E.2d at 689.
55. Id. S.C. at 244, 203 S.E.2d at 689.
56. The court cites Haelsloop v. City Council of Spartanburg, 123 S.C. 272, 115 S.E.
596 (1922) and Bobo v. City of Spartanburg, 230 S.C. 396, 96 S.E.2d 67 (1956). The
Haelsloop case is particularly illustrative of this proposition.
57. 262 S.C. at 244, 203 S.E.2d at 689.
58. See note 56 supra.
59. 123 S.C. at 278-79, 115 S.E. at 598.
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On the above stated grounds, the supreme court, adopting
the order of the trial court per curiam, refused to find that the
actions of the City and County of Greenville were in violation of
article 3, section 31.60
B. Just Compensation and Impairment of Contract
In Trustees of Columbia Academy v. Board of Trustees of
Richland County School DistrictNo. I,"1 the supreme court rule
that Act No. 58562 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1971
was, in part, unconstitutional, since it served to take property
without due process or compensation63 and amounted to a prohibited impairment of contract. 4
60. The question of a possible violation of article 10, section 6 on grounds that the
transaction required the credit of the state to be pledged or loaned for the benefit of a
corporation was dismissed with little comment. 262 S.C. at 243, 203 S.E.2d at 688.
61. 262 S.C. 117, 202 S.E.2d 860 (1974).
62. No. 585, [1971] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1087, in pertinent part, reads:
An Act To Amend Sections 21-3914 and 21-3916, Code Of Laws Of South
Carolina, 1962, as Amended, Relating To The Board Of Trustees Of School
District No. 1 In Richland County, So As To Provide For The Election Of Two
Additional School Trustees And To Delete Provisions For Appoimted Members
On Recommendation Of The Board Of Trustees Of Columbia Academy; To
Repeal Act No. 1632 Of 1795, Relating To The Board Of Trustees Of Columbia
Academy, And To Transfer The Title To Property Held By The Academy To
The School District.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina:
SECTION 1. School commissioners to be elected.Section 21-3914 of the 1962 Code, as last amended by Act No. 1005 of 1966, is
further amended to read as follows;
"Section 21-3914. Four school commissioners shall be elected in the general
election of 1972 and each four years thereafter, and three school commissioners
shall be elected in the general election of 1974 and each four years thereafter,
by the legal voters of the district. The terms of office of the commissioners shall
be for periods of four years and until their successors are elected and qualify."
SECTION 2. School Board-officers-employees.Section 21-3916 of the 1962 Code, as last amended by Act No. 1005 of 1966, is
further amended to read as follows:
"Section 21-3916. The school commissioners elected as provided for in Section 21-3914, being seven in all, shall constitute a school board and they may
assemble at any time and elect a chairman, a secretary, a superintendent of
schools and such other school employees as they deem proper whose terms of
office, duties and compensation shall be prescribed by the board."
SECTION 3. Act repealed.-Act No. 1632 of 1795 is hereby repealed. The title
to all real property and to all the improvements thereon held in the name of the
Board of Trustees of Columbia Academy is hereby transferred to School District
No. 1 of Richland County.
63. U.S. CONsT, amend. XIV; S.C. CONST. art. 1, §§ 5, 17.
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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The trustees of Columbia Academy were granted a charter
in 1795 by the General Assembly for the purpose of establishing
an educational institution in the City of Columbia and, pursuant
to that charter, acquired land and capital to further this purpose.6 5 In 1880 an act of the General Assembly created a school
district in the City of Columbia to provide for free public education66 and in 1883, after successfully operating two schools in Columbia for over eighty years, the Academy leased their properties
to the Columbia School District. In 1883 the General Assembly
amended its Act of 1880 to provide that two commisioners of the
Columbia School District were to be chosen on recommendation
of the trustees of the Academy. 7 In 1904, after what appears to
have been a series of short term leases, the two parties executed
the lease which is substantially the source of the present controversy. This lease, or "indenture," provided that the properties of
the Columbia Academy were to be leased, in perpetuity, to the
Columbia School District subject to five "conditions and covenants." A right of reentry was reserved to the Academy in event
of a breach." Covenant number four, specifically in dispute, specified "[t]hat the Board of School Commissioners for the City of
Columbia shall include two members who shall have been nominated by the party of the first part [the Academy] and commissioned by the Governor of the State.""
Act No. 585 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1971
contained three provisions which were the source of litigation.
The Act provided for the repeal of the 1795 charter of the Columbia Academy, the transfer of all property owned by the Academy
to Richland School District No. 6 and the elimination of the
appointment of two members of the School Board by the Academy. 70 The Academy, seeking declaratory relief, alleged that the
Act was a repeal of their charter of 1795 and an elimination of
their power to appoint two commissioners for the school board
and thereby constituted an impairment of contract expressly prohibited in both the state and federal constitutions. It was further
65. Record at 17.
66. No. 333, [1880] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 404.
67. No. 269, [1883] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 415.
68. 262 S.C. at 123, 202 S.E.2d at 862.
69. Id. at 123, 202 S.E.2d at 863.
70. Id. at 124, 202 S.E.2d at 863. The Columbia School District had been included
in Richland County School District 1 by the General Assembly in 1930. No. 1106, [1930]
S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2015.
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alleged that the attempted transfer of title to their property to the
School District by statute amounted to a deprivation of property
without due process or compensation.
In attacking the attempted repeal of their corporate charter,
the Academy argued that the charter was a contract between
them and the state which was constitutionally protected against
impairment. At the issuance of the 1795 charter, charters of private entitites, as opposed to public, were protected from revocation by the impairment prohibitions of the two constitutions."
The validity of the revocation of the Academy's charter, therefore, rested ultimately upon the question of whether the institution was public or private. The court found that although the
Academy was partially endowed with public monies, the public
nature of a corporation arose not from funding, but from the
government's ability "to regulate, control and direct the corporation and its funds and its franchises, at its own will and pleasure."72 The Academy's charter granted the trustees full power to
control and perpetuate its educational activities without supervision by the state. The existence of this power was found sufficient
to justify a private characterization for the corporation and pro73
hibit the repeal of the charter.
The finding that the nature of the charter was private was
also determinative in deciding whether or not the portion of the
statute purporting to transfer the property to Richland School
District No. 1 constituted an impermissible taking of property
without due process or just compensation. The court reasoned
that an attempt to divest a corporation of title to property by
statute would only be permissible if the corporation was a public
body. 4 After characterizing the Academy as a private corporation, there could be "no doubt that this provision of the Statute
is in violation of Article I, Sec. 5 and Sec. 17 of the Constitution
of South Carolina and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con71. This proposition was the basis for the decision in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). A similar situation involving the Medical College of
South Carolina was presented in State v. Heyward, 15 S.C. 148, 3 Rich. 389 (1832). The
court noted that this rule is now changed by S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-401 (1962), adopted in
1841, where the General Assembly specifically reserves the power to amend, alter or repeal
charters of private corporations. 262 S.C. at 126, 202 S.E.2d at 864.
72. 262 S.C. at 126, 202 S.E.2d at 864, quotingfrom Strauss v. Marlboro County Gen.
Hospital, 185 S.C. 425, 195 S.E. 65 and Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518 (1819).
73. 262 S.C. at,127, 202 S.E.2d at 865.
74. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss2/4

12

et al.: Constitutional Law

1975]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

stitution of the United States." 75
The Academy also attacked the provisions of Act 585.which
removed their power to appoint two members of Richland School
District No. l's Board on grounds that it constituted a prohibited
impairment of the obligations of the lease contract. 76 As a condition for the perpetual lease granted in 1904, the Academy had
required a continuing right to have two members of the Board
appointed by the Governor upon recommendation by the Academy; the Board had agreed. 77 The authority of the Board to agree
to such an arrangement, however, was based on two acts of the
General Assembly, each providing for the establishment of the
District and the composition of its Board of Trustees. 7 The court
determined that the Academy's power to appoint two commissioners was based on the statute of 1883 and not on the contractual provision. The facts indicated that the Academy had not
required this power as a lease condition until 1904, but had been
exercising it under the statute since 1883. The District had no
power, other than that granted by the legislature, to provide for
the constitutency or selection of their Board membership; any
attempt to grant that power to others under contract, therefore,
was based upon and subject to statutory authorization. When the
Board agreed to condition the 1904 lease upon the power of the
Academy to appoint two of its members, its authority to do so was
implicitly conditioned upon the continuing presence of enabling
legislation passed by the General Assembly. If the contractural
condition providing for the Academy's right to appoint was based
on specific statutory authority, then an alteration of that authority did not impair the obligations required of the parties to the
lease contract. Alteration merely served to remove the statutory
authority under which the School District fulfilled its obligations.
Noting that the question had been reserved at the trial level, the
court did not rule on whether or not the District was entitled to
75. Id.
76. Id. at 124, 202 S.E.2d at 863.
77. Id. at 123, 202 S.E.2d at 862.
78. No. 333, [1880] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 404, as amended No. 269, [1883] S.C. Acts
& Jt. Res. 415, and No. 1106, [1930] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2015. The 1880 Act established
a public school system for the City of Columbia and the 1883 amendment provided for
the appointment of two school commissioners by the Governor on recommendation from
the Board of Trustees of the Columbia Academy. The Act of 1930 consolidated the old
Columbia School District with several others to form Richland School District No. 1
Section 5 of the 1930 Act specifically provided for the appointment of two commissioners
on recommendation of the Academy.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1975

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

remain in possession of the leasehold after failing to fulfill its
79
obligations under the lease contract.
C.

Taxation

In Holzwasser v. Brady,8" the South Carolina Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the State Tax Commission's assessment of property owned by, or leased to, manufacturers for
ad valorem tax purposes pursuant to sections 65-64(17)"1 and 651647.112 of the Code.
Holzwasser leased property to a manufacturing concern in
Spartanburg County and filed the requisite tax return with the
South Carolina Tax Commission."' Consequently, her property
was assessed for tax purposes at a figure equal to 9.5 percent of
its fair market value.8 4 If the property had not been used by a
manufacturer or was not otherwise subject to the provisions of
section 6 5 -64(1 7 ),s assessment would be made by the Spartanburg County taxing authorities and, accordingly, would receive a
taxable value of 4.2 percent of market value.8" The actual amount
79. 262 S.C. at 128, 202 S.E.2d at 865.
80. 262 S.C. 481, 205 S.E.2d 701 (1974).
81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-64(17) (Cum. Supp. 1974), provides that the South Carolina
Tax Commission
[sihall assess and equalize taxable values upon the property and franchises of
street railway companies, electric railways, water, heat, light and power companies and private car lines, and shall assess and equalize all real and tangible
personal property of manufacturers, except as to inventory, only manufactured
articles which have been offered for sale at retail or which have been available
for sale at retail shall be included in the inventory listed in such return. The
Commission shall also assess to the owner thereof all real or personal property
leased to or used by a manufacturer. All such companies shall make returns to
the Commission on forms prescribed by the Commission. The owner of property
leased to or used by a manufacturer shall make returns thereof to the Tax
Commission on forms prescribed by the Commission.
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-1647.1 (Cum. Supp. 1974), provides in part:
Notwithstanding, any other provisions of law, the assessment for property taxation of merchant's inventories, equipment, furniture and fixtures. . . which are
depreciated according to a schedule satisfactory to the South Carolina Tax
Commission, and manufacturers' real and tangible personal property, and the
machinery, equipment, furniture and fixtures of all other taxpayers required to
file returns with the South Carolina Tax Commission for purposes of assessment
for property taxation, shall be determined by the Tax Commission from property tax returns submitted by the taxpayers to the Tax Commission. ...
83. Id.
84. The figure of 9.5 percent is in accordance with Act No. 1266, [1972] S.C. Acts &
Jt. Res. 2467.
85. See note 81 supra.
86. See No. 1253, [1968] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2837.
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of tax paid is then determined by applying the millage rate of the
taxing district to the resulting figure."7 Holzwasser paid her taxes
as calculated by the higher rate and, pursuant to section 652662,18 brough an action in the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County against the defendant, in his capacity as County
Treasurer, for a refund.
The basis of her claim was that the application of sections
65-64(17) and 65-1647.1 caused two different ratios to be applied
in determining the taxable value of similar property in the same
county and therefore resulted in unequal and nonuniform taxation of property in violation of article 3, section 299 and article
10, sections 2,90 3A,11 and 5(1)92 of the South Carolina Constitution. The lower court held that the assessment ratio in excess of
4.2 percent was unconstitutional.
The majority of the supreme court found that the General
Assembly had the power to classify persons and property for the
purposes of taxation93 and that the specific constitutional requirements of equality and uniformity9 4 applied only to persons and
property within a validly established taxation category.95 The
majority relied almost exclusively upon a quotation from a legal
encyclopedia 9 6 incorporated into the previous decision of
Newberry Mills v. Dawkins.9 7 This passage reads "[g]enerally,
87. 262 S.C. at 484, 205 S.E.2d at 702.
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-2662 (1962).
89. S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 29 provides: "All taxes upon property, real and personal,
shall be laid upon the actual value of the property taxed, as the same shall be ascertained
by an assessment made for the purpose of laying such tax."
90. S.C. CONST. art. 10, § 1 provides, in part: "The General Assembly shall provide
by law for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe
regulations to secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, real, personal and
possessory .... "
91. S.C. CONST. art. 10, § 3A provides: "All property subject to taxation shall be
taxed in proportion to its value."
92. S.C. CONST. art. 10, § 5(1) provides, in part: "The corporate authorities of counties, townships, school districts, cities, towns and villages may be vested with power to
assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes; such taxes to be uniform in respect to
persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same."
93. Holzwasser also alleged that the statute denied the equal protection guaranteed
her by S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 5 and U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The court held that,
under existing law, a "reasonable relationship" standard for tax classifications was sufficient to satisfy the equal protection requirement. 262 S.C. at 487, 205 S.E.2d at 703.
94. See notes 89-92 supra.
95. 262 S.C. at 487, 205 S.E.2d at 703.
96. Id. at 488, 205 S.E.2d at 704.
97. 259 S.C. 7, 190 S.E.2d 503 (1972).
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within constitutional limitations, the state has power to classify
persons or property for purposes of taxation, and the exercise of
such power is not forbidden by the constitutional requirement
that the taxation be uniform and equal provided the tax is uniform on all members of the same class and provided the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.""8
The minority in Holzwasser distinguished Newberry Mills by
showing that the difference between the assessment ratios was
not between real property owned by or leased to manufacturers
and other real property, but rather between the real property
assessment ratio and the personal property assessment ratio.9
The system in that case involved the question of whether a 10
percent assessment ratio for personalty and a 5 percent assessment ratio for realty was violative of the constitutional requirements of uniformity when applied throughout an entire county."'
The result of the taxation scheme was that all owners of both
types of property paid at identical rates. The Holzwasser minority noted that in the litigation which ultimately led to Newberry
Mills, the Tax Board of Review ruled in the taxpayer's favor on
the exact question that was before the court in Holzwasser. The
Newberry Mills court commented:
The order of the Tax Board of Review requires the commission
to use the same ratios for manufactures' realty and personalty
as used by the local authorities for realty and personalty of other
taxpayers. There is therefore equality and uniformity in the
assessment as required by the constitution and statutes.''
As the dissent in Holzwasser correctly noted, the court in
Newberry Mills, rather than supporting a different ad valorem
rate for manufacturers' property, was implying that the application of identical assessment ratios for the same type property in
the same county was necessary to achieve constitutional uniformity and equality.
In Holzwasser, however, the court concluded that legislative
tax classifications carry a strong presumption of validity and, in
the absence of a showing that such classificatioms are arbitrary
98. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 36, p. 112.

99. 259 S.C. at 13, 190 S.E.2d at 506.
100. 262 S.C. at 491, 205 S.E.2d at 706. The dissent of Justices Brailsford and Bussey
quoted quite liberally from the decree of Circuit Judge Grimball.
101. 259 S.C. at 14, 190 S.E.2d at 506.
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and unreasonable, should be upheld. 02 The majority reasoned
that if the tax classification based on types of property in
Newberry Mills was reasonable, then the classification in
Holzwasser, based on land use would certainly be, also." 3
The court commented that, given the validity of a taxing
classification, an unequal and nonuniform rate of assessment
might still occur, not between the designated class and others,
but between the members of the class.0 4 It would seem, therefore,
that if the classification consisted of property used for manufacturing, and the system resulted in inequalities being imposed on
manufacturers from county to county by reason of varying taxation rates, then a possible constitutional problem would arise.
Millage rates applied by county taxation districts are to a great
extent determined by the county's assessment ratio, i. e., a certain
county may determine the taxable value of land at a lower
percentage of its actual value and make up for this low assessment ratio with a higher millage rate. On the other hand, the
identical amount of revenue could be raised on land of similar
value by lowering the millage rate and raising the assessment
ratio. By requiring all property used in manufacturing to carry a
rigid and identical assessment ratio from county to county, the
system gives members of this tax classification no relief when
they are located in a county with a low assessment ratio and high
district millage rates. In such a situation, the result would be that
other members of the same classification might well be receiving
comparable county services and have property of comparable
value but have an effective rate of taxation which is much lower,
being both unequal and nonuniform.
The problem of equality of taxation came before the court in
another fashion this year in United States Fidelity and Guar. Co.
v. City of Spartanburg,"5 which concerned the recurring problem
of the validity of the application of different rates to different
businesses for the purpose of determining municipal business license taxes.00 United States Fidelity represented itself and the
102. 262 S.C. at 488, 205 S.E.2d at 704.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 263 S.C. 169, 209 S.E.2d 36 (1974).
106. This method of classification has been challenged before the South Carolina
Supreme Court in two recent cases, United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. City of
Newberry, 257 S.C. 433, 186 S.E.2d 239 (1972) and United States Fidelity and Guar. Co.
v. City of Newberry, 253 S.C. 197, 169 S.E.2d 599 (1969). General discussions of these
opinions may be found at 22 S.C.L. RaV. 652 (1970) and 24 S.C.L. Rav. 658 (1972).
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class of fire and casualty insurers in the city of Spartanburg who.
were attacking the city's Business License Ordinance as denying
them equal protection as required by the state'"' and federal' 8
constitutions by taxing their gross business receipts at a rate
double that of the next highest category and greatly higher than
the vast majority of businesses in the city.' 9 The court noted that
in cases such as these, there is a strong presumption of validity
for upholding tax classifications but cited the recent case of
United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. City of Newberry"' as
authority for the rule that great differences in business license tax
rates charged to different types of businesses will be considered
constitutionally invalid unless the municipality can establish a
rational basis for the increased tax."'
Fire and casualty insurers constituted a mere 7 percent of the
total business licenses in Spartanburg. The city's Business License Ordinance, however, provided rates which resulted in these
businesses paying a full 20 percent of total business license revenues."' In addition, the rate of tax imposed on fire and casualty
insurers, which amounted to $20 per $1000 of gross receipts, was
3
twice that imposed on the next highest category."1
The court found that these figures, while not patently unreasonable, certainly created enough of a disparity in the rate of
taxation between the classifications to overcome the presumption
of validity and require a showing of a rational basis by the municipality." 4
The city advanced two reasons to justify the higher tax on
fire and casualty insurers. First, insurers of property, by the very
nature of their business, receive much more benefit from the fire
and police protection than most businesses. Secondly, fire and
casualty insurers, as a class, contribute little to financing the
city's operations through the ad valorem tax and should make
their contribution through a higher business tax."15 The insurers,
however, argued that the city's reasons were "irrelevant to the
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
263 S.C. at 171, 209 S.E.2d at 36.
See note 106 supra.
263 S.C. at 172, 209 S.E.2d at 37.
Id. at 169, 209 S.E.2d at 38.
Id.
263 S.C. at 172, 209 S.E.2d at 37.
Id.
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determination of a fair business license tax" ' and should not be
considered as the basis of a valid classification which bore a rational relationship to a permissible governmental goal.
The court employed the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Pacific Export Co. v. Seibert1 7 to find that the
city's justifications established a reasonable and permissible
basis for increased taxation by, in fact, creating different classifications for those substantially subject to ad valorem taxes and
those which are not."' In Seibert, a state tax was levied against
express companies who contracted with railroad and steamship
lines but was not charged against express companies owned and
operated by the carriers themselves. The state's justification for
the tax was that the carriers paid taxes on their tracks, terminals,
ships and rolling-stock while a direct tax was the only method of
taxing the companies which only dealt by contract and had no
tangible property to tax.1 The South Carolina Supreme Court in
United States Fidelity made the logical conclusion that the absence of any other effective taxing mechanism was a proper criterion for establishing a tax classification with higher rates to provide for some tax contribution from a group that reaps substan2 0
tial benefits from the city's public services.
II.

A.

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Equal Protection-StateRegulation of Foreign Corporations

In American Trust Co. v. South Carolina State Board of
Bank Control,'2 1 a three judge federal panel ruled that parts of
South Carolina's statutory effort to prevent North Carolina and
Georgia banks from competing with the local banking industry in
the trust business constituted a denial of equal protection. The
case involved an attack on three sections of the South Carolina
Code which: (1) required all banks doing trust business in this
state to receive written approval by the State Board of Bank
Control, 122 (2) prohibited foreign controlled domestic corporations
116. Id.
117. 142 U.S. 339 (1892).
118. 263 S.C. at 174-75, 209 S.E.2d at 38.
119. 142 U.S. at 345.
120. 263 S.C. at 175, 209 S.E.2d at 38.
121. 381 F. Supp. 313 (D.S.C. 1974).
122. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-580 (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides:
No corporation, partnership or other person shall conduct a trust business in this
State without first making a written application to the State Board of Bank
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from serving as executors, administrators1 23 or testamentary trustees,' 24 and (3) prohibited corporations domiciled in states adjaControl and receiving written approval from the Board. Before any such application shall be approved, the Board shall make an investigation to determine
whether or not the applicant has complied with all the provisions of law,
whether in the judgment of the Board the applicant is qualified to conduct such
a business and whether the conduct of such a business would serve the public
interest, taking into consideration local circumstances and conditions at the
place where such applicant proposes to do business; provided,however, that any
person actively engaged in conducting a trust business in this State on January
1 1972, shall not be required to make the application and receive the approval
provided for herein. Provided, further, that nothing contained in this section
shall prevent a natural person or a national banking association having its
principal place of business in this State from qualifying and acting as trustee,
executor, administrator, guardian, committee or in any other fiduciary capacity.
123. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-592 (Cum. Supp. 1972) provides:
No corporation created by another state of the United States or by any foreign
state, kingdom or government, and no corporation created under the laws of the
United States and not having a business in this State shall be eligible or entitled
to qualify or serve in this State as executor or administrator of the estate of any
person domiciled in this State at the time of his death, whether the decedent
shall die testate or intestate. No officer, employee, or agent of such foreign
corporation shall be eligible to serve as executor or administrator in this State,
whether the officer, employee, or agent is a resident or a nonresident of this
State, if such officer, employee, or agent is acting as executor or administrator
on behalf of such corporation.
No corporation, partnership or organization controlled, directly or indirectly, by such a foreign corporation shall be eligible or entitled to serve as
executor or administrator in this State.
124. S.C. CODE ANN. § 67-53 (Cum. Supp. 1972) provides in part:
(a) No corporation created by another state of the United States or by any
foreign state, kingdom, or government, and no corporation created under the
laws of the United States and not having a place of business in the State of
South Carolina shall be eligible or entitled to qualify, serve, or hold title to
property in this State as testamentary trustee of an estate of any person domiciled in this State at the time of his death, whether the decedent shall die testate
or intestate, except, however, such foreign corporations may act as testamentary
trustee in this State if:
(1) It has a bona fide capital of at least two hundred fifty thousand
dollars actually paid in;
(2) It is authorized to act as testamentary trustee in the state in which
it is incorporated or if such foreign corporation be a national banking
association in the state in which it has its principal place of business; and
(3) Any bank or other corporation organized under the laws of this State
or a national banking association having its principal place of business
in this State is permitted by law to act as testamentary trustee in the
state in which such foreign corporation seeking to act in this State is
organized or in which it has its principal place of business if it is a
national banking association without further showing or qualification
other than that it is authorized to act in such fiduciary capacity in this
State and upon compliance with the laws of such other state, if any,
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cent to South Carolina from acting as testamentary trustees.1 1
American Trust Company is a South Carolina corporation
wholly owned and created by National Bank of North Carolina
Corporation'26 in 1970 for the purpose of transacting trust busi1 27
ness in South Carolina in accordance with section 67-53(a)(4)
of the South Carolina Code.1 2 This section had been amended
earlier in 1970 to prevent foreign corporations domiciled in states
contiguous to South Carolina from acting as trustees within the
state.' 21 Since NCNB had developed a substantial trust business
in South Carolina, it formed American Trust to enable itself to
continue providing servies to its South Carolina customers. In
1972, before American Trust could effectively begin operation,
the General Assembly took steps apparently designed to prevent
the action taken by NCNB by amending sections 19-592'1 " and 6753.131 These amendments specifically forbade foreign corporations
conducting business in South Carolina from acting as trustees,
executors or administrators in South Carolina. American Trust
and NCNB brought suit alleging that the statutes constituted a
denial of due process and equal protection and created an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.
American Trust attacked the amendments barring foreign
controlled domestic corporations from engaging in the trust busi-

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

concerning service of process on nonresident fiduciaries. Such foreign
corporations seeking to act as testamentary trustee in this State, upon
qualifying to act in such fiduciary capacity, shall not be required by law
to give bond except as required of a resident corporate fiduciary in like
circumstances. No officer, employee or agent of any such foreign corporation shall be eligible or entitled to serve as testamentary trustee in this
State whether such officer, employee, or agent is a resident or a nonresident of this State if such officer, employee, or agent is acting as
testamentary trustee on behalf of any such foreign corporation except
when such foreign corporation itself shall be eligible to so serve.
No corporation, partnership or other organization controlled, directly
or indirectly, by such a foreign corporation shall be eligible or entitled to
serve as testamentary trustee in this State, except when such foreign
corporation itself shall be eligible to so serve.
(4) Such foreign corporation is not domiciled or licensed to do business
in a state contiguous to the State of South Carolina.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 67-53(4) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
Hereinafter cited as NCNB.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 67-53(4) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
381 F. Supp. at 318.
See note 3 supra.
Id.
Id.
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ness as being a denial of equal protection by discriminating
32
against them in favor of domestically controlled corporations.
The court approached the question in terms of traditional equal
protection analysis.' 33 When a statutory classification does not
discriminate against a suspect class or infringe upon a fundamental right'3 4 the test of its validity is whether it bears a rational
relationship to the furtherance of a valid state goal. A passage
used by the court is instructive:
In applying [the equal protection] clause, this Court has consistently recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
deny to States the power to treat different classes of persons in
different ways. . . . The Equal Protection Clause of that
amendment does, however, deny to States the power to legislate
that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a
statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification "must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall
be treated alike." . . .135
South Carolina maintained that it had a valid interest in insuring
the competence and reliability of corporate fiduciaries. To further
this interest it had been necessary to pass the two amendments
to "[assure] local control over fiduciaries and [to prevent] destructive competition to native controlled corporations for the
ultimate benefit of the public."'3 6 The court found that measures
calculated to insure local control of corporate fiduciaries and to
prevent competition which may be detrimental to the public were
certainly valid objectives for state legislation.3 7 The problem,
however, was that the classification system under question, foreign versus domestically controlled trust companies, had no "fair
132. 381 F. Supp. at 319.

133. Id.
134. An alternative analysis is required when a state, through the exercise of its police
power, develops a classification system which works to the disadvantage of a "suspect"
class or restricts a "fundamental" right. Under this analysis, the classification system can
only be justified by a "compelling state interest" rather than the traditional test of "rational relationship" to a valid state goal. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250 (1974), Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745 (1966).
135. 381 F. Supp. at 320, quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
136. 381 F. Supp. at 319.
137. Id. at 321.
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and substantial relationship" to these valid state goals.'3 In
reaching this decision, the court noted that a domestic trust company was subject to the same degree of state regulation and control regardless of the location of its owners.' 9 The court also found
that the statutory classification system, being based upon a
theory which claimed that foreign control of domestic trust companies was inherently detrimental to the public interest, was totally speculative and directly in conflict with the conclusions
reached by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.'4 0 As a result of their constitutional analysis, the court struck
down these portions of section 67-53(a)(3) and section 19-592 as
denying equal protection to foreign controlled domestic trust institutions.
NCNB also attacked section 67-53(a) (4), ""which forbids foreign corporations in contiguous states from acting as testamentary trustees, as being violative of due porcess' 2 and serving as
an undue restriction on interstate commerce."' The court's treatment of the challenge to the statute as an unacceptable restraint
on interstate commerce was based on their interpretation of the
federal statute enabling national banks to act as fiduciaries. After
finding that NCNB's operation in South Carolina constituted
interstate commerce,"' the court further noted that the authority
of national banks to do business was based solely on that granted
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See note 3 supra.
142. The court treated the due process challenge in an almost perfunctory manner.
They cited North Dakota St. Bd. of Pharm. v. Snyder's Drug Store, Inc., 414 U.S. 156
(1973), for the proposition that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment will
not prevent states from regulating businesses subject to state control. 318 F. Supp. at 322.
Snyder was one of the latest in a line of cases beginning in the depression which substantially removed the due process clause as a grounds for overturning state statutes regulating
business. The United States Supreme Court had originally required that a regulatory state
bear "a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or some other
phase of the general welfare." Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111 (1928).
The Supreme Court began its retreat from this position in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934), and its present view was best described in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v.
Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 at 536-37 (1949):
[T]he due process clause is no longer to be so broadly construed that the
Congress and state legislatures are put in a straight jacket when they attempt
to suppress business and industrial conditions which they regard as offensive to
the public welfare.
143. 381 F. Supp. at 321-22.
144. Id. at 322.
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them by Congress. 45 A state's restriction of a national bank must
confine congressional authority to some extent before it can be
properly considered a burden on interstate trade. The federal
statute which grants national banks the authority to act as fidcuiaries is 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a) and (b).' 46 This section provides that
a national bank may serve as a fiduciary whenever the state in
which it is doing business allows state chartered companies to do
so; so long as the national bank's action is not in contravention
of state and local law.' 41 Subsection (b), however, specifically
states that a national bank's role as a fiduciary will not be considered a violation of state law under subsection (a) if state banks
are allowed to act in the same capacity.148 This would mean that
if a state chartered bank in South Carolina were allowed to act
in a particular fiduciary capacity under state law, then a national
bank in South Carolina would have similar federal authority. No
differentiation in state law between treatment of state and federally chartered banks could constitutionally serve to diminish the
authority granted to national banks in this area by Congress. The
state statutes in question here made no attempt to differentiate
between state and national banks within the state but rather
between all banks within the state and those in contiguous states.
It was, therefore, an acceptable and effective limitation on the
authority granted, subject to state statute, in subsection (a).
Since NCNB's congressional authority to operate as a fiduciary
in South Carolina was made subject to contrary state legislation,
that legislation could not be said to burden interstate commerce.
145. Id.
146. 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1970) provides:
(a) The Comptroller of the Currency shall be authorized and empowered to
grant by special permit to national banks applying therefor, when not in contravention of State or local law, the right to act as trustee, executor, administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, committee of estates of lunatics, or in any other fiduciary capacity in which State
banks, trust companies, or other corporations which come into competition with
national banks are permitted to act under the laws of the State in which the
national bank is located.
(b) Whenever the laws of such State authorize or permit the exercise of any
or all of the foregoing powers by State banks, trust companies, or other corporations which compete with national banks, the granting to and the exercise of
such powers by national banks shall not be deemed to be in contravention of
State or local law within the meaning of this section.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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B. Rules Governing Admission to the Bar
In Hawkins v. Moss,' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the constitutionality of Rule 10 of the Rules of Examination and Admission of Persons to Practice Law in South Carolina.'50 Rule 10 allowed attorneys licensed to practice in other
jurisdictions to be admitted to the South Carolina Bar without a
bar examination if the state from which the attorney came reciprocated to admit South Carolina attorneys. The plaintiff was a
resident of South Carolina and licensed to practice law in New
Jersey. New Jersey did not reciprocate with South Carolina, however, and the exemption of Rule 10 was not available to him."'
As a result, if the plaintiff wished to be admitted to the South
Carolina Bar he would be required to successfully complete the
written bar examination as are all resident applicants. He contended that Rule 10 denied him equal protection of the laws by
unlawfully discriminating against persons from nonreciprocating
states 5 ' and that it abridged the privileges and immunities guaranteed to him by the fourteenth amendment and article IV, section 2 by infringing on his right to interstate travel.'5 3

The court approached the equal protection question by
agreeing with the plaintiff's contention that Rule 10 resulted in
classification of attorneys seeking admission to the South Carolina Bar from other states into two groups: those from reciprocating and those from nonreciprocating states." The treatment of
149. 503 F.2d 1171 (1974).
150. Rule 10, in pertinent part, provided:
Any attorney admitted to practice law in the highest court of the District of
Columbia or in the highest court of another state in which the standard of
admission is substantially equivalent to the standard of this State, who has been
actively engaged for at least five (5) years next preceding filing of his
application, either in the practice of law or, during said period has been a judge
of a court of record or teacher of law, may be admitted to the Bar of South
Carolina, without examination, upon satisfactory proof that he is a citizen of
the United States and an actual resident of this State and intends to practice
or teach law therein, is at least 26 years of age, and a person of good moral
character.
Attorneys from states not extending reciprocity on substantially equal
terms to attorneys licensed in this State shall not be admitted under this rule.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, subsequent to the initiation of this action,
repealed rule 10.
151. 503 F.2d at 1175.
152. Id. at 1176.
153. Id. at 1178-79.
154. Id. at 1177.
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the two groups under Rule 10 was radically different in that one
group was exempt from the requirement of taking a bar examination and the other was not. Under traditional equal protection
analysis, however, classifications resulting in unequal treatment
are unconstitutional only when the classification system used
bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state goal or policy."' The court observed that reciprocity statutes were much
needed, widely used tools by which a state government can undertake "to secure for its citizens an advantage by offering that
advantage to citizens of any other state on condition that the
other state make a similar grant."'56 The pursuit of reciprocal
benefits for its own citizens who migrate to other states was considered a legitimate state goal which served to uphold the different treatment of applicants from reciprocating and nonreciprocating states.'57 The "rational relationship" of Rule 10 to such a goal
developed from its denial of the provisions to citizens from nonreciprocating states. This served to encourage nonreciprocating
states to take the measures necessary to begin a program of reciprocity in order that their migrant citizens could receive like
benefits.
Hawkins also argued that Rule 10 denied him the privileges
and immunities protected by the fourteenth amendment and article IV, section 2.111 The privileges and immunities protected by
the fourteenth amendment have been narrowly described by the
Supreme Court of the United States as being those rights of national citizenship "which owe their existence to the Federal Government, its national character, its Constitution, or its laws."', 9
The Court, in a later case, gave several examples of certain rights
of national citizenship which were expressed or implied by the
nature of the federal union:
the right to pass freely from state to state . . . . the right to
petition Congress for redress of grievances . . . , the right to
vote for national officers . . . , the right to enter public lands
. . . and the right to1 60inform the United States authorities of
violations of its laws.
155. Id., citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
156. 503 F.2d at 1177.

157. Id.
158. See note 191 supra.
159. The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873).
160. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908).
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Although it remains unclear from plaintiffs brief on appeal, he
seems to have asserted that one of the rights of national citizenship was the right of a qualified professional to move from one
state to another without having to make some additional exhibition of competence in the new jurisdiction.' His position was,
essentially, that since he was judged qualified to practice law in
New Jersey, one of the privileges and immunities of his national
citizenship was to be able to travel to any state and practice his
profession when he arrived. The court, however, found that the
state's attempts to insure competency in the legal profession by
the requirement of a written examination did not actually effect
the appellant's right to interstate travel as guaranteed by the
privileges and immunities clause but merely served to insure his
competency to practice law within the state.'62 Any incidental
effect that the state's constitutionally permissible regulation of a
profession might have on a migrant member of that profession
would not amount to an infringement of that citizen's right to
13
travel. 1
The privileges and immunities protected by article IV, section 2 of the Constitution have been interpreted in such a manner
as to forbid states from placing disabilities on citizens of other
states in favor of its own citizens. The purpose of this provision
was outlined succinctly by the United States Supreme Court in
Paul v. Virginia:
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place
the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens
of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned. It relieves them from disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other States; it gives them the right of
free ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures
to them in other States the same freedom possessed by the
citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of
property and in the pursuit of happiness; and it secures to them
in other states the equal protection of their laws.'64
The court felt that even if discrimination did exist under Rule 10
between the treatment of attorneys from reciprocating and nonre161.
162.
163.
164.

Brief for Appellant at 21-25.
503 F.2d at 1179.
Id.
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869).
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ciprocating states, it was irrelevant for purposes of testing the
validity of the rule under article IV, section 2. In order for the rule
to be invalid under this clause of the Constitution, it would need
to discriminate in favor of in-state, as opposed to out-of-state,
applicants.'65 The court in Hawkins found that no such discrimination existed in that the claimant was subject to the same written examination required of all South Carolina citizens who applied for admission to the State Bar.'66
165. 503 F.2d at 1180.
166. Id.
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